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Abstract 
This paper reviews and critically comments on the policy debate surrounding China’s 
exchange rate regime. There are presently two key issues – firstly, whether the RMB has 
become significantly undervalued, and secondly, whether China would benefit from 
adopting a flexible exchange rate regime. We find little rigorous evidence in support of 
the first proposition. With respect to the second, the consensus view is that a flexible 
exchange rate is desirable as it would support macroeconomic stability by providing 
greater monetary independence. Most absent in this position is convincing evidence that 
exchange rate stability is associated with macroeconomic instability, either in the context 
of China or broader international experience. The consensus position also appears to 
understate many of the benefits that accrue to China as a result of having a stable 
exchange rate, as well as many of the costs associated with moving to greater flexibility. 
We conclude that while adopting a flexible exchange rate regime may pass the 
cost/benefit test sometime in the future, for now the focus ought to firmly be on domestic 
financial reform.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
One might imagine that an exchange rate left unchanged for 11 years would not generate 
much interest. Yet toward the end of 2004 The Economist magazine (01/10/2004) 
observed that issues surrounding China’s fixed exchange rate, in which the Renminbi 
(RMB) had been pegged to the U.S dollar at a rate of RMB8.28:$US1 since 1994, had 
become amongst the hottest topics in international finance. Since late 2000, much of the 
interest has been prompted by speculation that China would revalue its currency. The 
chief impetus for this speculation has been an accusation emanating from U.S 
government circles that the dollar peg is a prominent cause of the U.S trade deficit with 
China. The contention is that the RMB is pegged at an undervalued rate and is a source of 
unfair advantage for Chinese exporters. In a report to Congress in May 2005, Secretary of 
the U.S Treasury John Snow described China’s exchange rate policies as being "highly 
distortionary" and, if left unaltered, would lead to China being labeled an exchange 
manipulator under the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988. Secretary Snow 
stated in the report that the U.S government was calling on China to adopt a more flexible 
exchange rate regime. European Union (EU) officials and the G-7 group have echoed this 
call as the Euro in particular is seen as having been forced to bear the brunt of the dollar’s 
depreciation since 2002. Between 2002 and 2004, the EU trade deficit with China more 
than doubled, compared with the U.S trade deficit with China which increased by a little 
over one half (WSJ, 17/05/2005). In the first half of 2005 trade disputes in textiles 
became particularly prominent, with both the U.S and E.U erecting punitive measures in 
May to slow a surge in Chinese imports that resulted from the phasing out of global 
textiles quotas at the end of 2004.  
 
Outside of government circles, calls for greater exchange rate flexibility also became the 
norm from economists in the international organizations such as the IMF (Rajan and 
Subramanian, 2004; Prasad, et al., 2005) and the Asian Development Bank (ADB) (IHT, 
28/05/2005), as well as from those based in central banks, research institutes and 
academia such as Roberts and Tyers (2003), Bergsten (2003), Eichengreen (2004), 
Goldstein and Lardy (2004), Bernanke (2005), Roubini and Setser (2005) and Frankel 
(2005). While most of these authors concur with the U.S government position that the 
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RMB is, if anything, undervalued, this is not their primarily focus. Rather, the 
commonality they share is the viewpoint that greater exchange rate flexibility would be in 
China’s own best interests as it would support macroeconomic stability by providing 
greater monetary independence. This became a topical issue during 2003 and 2004 when 
inflows of hot money betting on an RMB appreciation correlated with rapid growth in the 
domestic money supply and in real estate prices in cities such as Shanghai.  
 
In response to accusations of undervaluation, high-level officials in China initially 
retorted that greater pressure from abroad for more rapid reform would only slow the 
process down (e.g., People’s Daily, 13/05/2005). July 2005 saw a concession of sorts 
with the RMB revalued by 2.1 percent to RMB8.11:$US1 and the announcement that the 
currency’s value would be linked to an undisclosed basket of currencies. Following this 
move, officials speaking in the government-run media began referring to the country’s 
new “flexible” or “floating” exchange rate regime (e.g., People’s Daily, 22/09/2005). In 
reality however, any newfound flexibility is limited. At the time of writing in September 
2005, the most the RMB had been allowed to appreciate was RMB8.08:$US1, or less 
than an additional 0.5% over the initial revaluation. Such changes amount to tinkering 
around the edges and nothing like the degree of flexibility being called for by the 
consensus position.   
 
This paper reviews and critically comments on the policy debate surrounding China’s 
exchange rate regime. There are two key issues – firstly, whether the RMB has become 
significantly undervalued, and secondly, whether China would benefit from adopting a 
flexible exchange rate regime. Section two finds that the usual justifications given for 
claims that the RMB is undervalued have a poor basis in evidence. In section three we 
offer a critique of the consensus position that China would now be best served by 
adopting a more flexible exchange rate regime. Our primary purpose here is to present 
the other side of the flexibility debate, which hitherto has been marginalized in the 
existing literature. Moving away from a stable exchange rate would be an abandonment 
of a policy that seemingly has served the country well for more than a decade and in our 
 3
estimation the case for doing so is far less convincing than the consensus position 
portrays. Section four summarizes the discussion. 
 
2. THE VALUATION DEBATE 
There are four common arguments presented in support of the view that the RMB is 
significantly undervalued. These include – 
 
1. China’s large and growing trade surplus with the U.S proves that the RMB is 
undervalued and that China is unfairly benefiting from trade.  
 
The problem with this argument is that economic theory does not suggest that any 
country will or should have balanced trade with each of its trading partners. This will be 
dynamically determined by many factors, principally comparative advantage 
considerations. Part of the increase in the U.S trade deficit with China simply reflects 
comparative advantage considerations being allowed to run their course after having been 
suppressed in the past by, for example, barriers to trade such as the Multifibre 
Agreement. China is also a relatively new member of the global economy and its exports 
are growing from a very small base. Another part of the rising U.S trade deficit with 
China is the result of foreign direct investment emerging as a means of recycling a 
country’s comparative advantage. U.S firms, as well as those of U.S trading partners such 
as Japan and the Asian tigers (Hong Kong, Korea, Singapore, Taiwan), have all been 
active in relocating labour-intensive manufacturing production to China in a bid to 
remain competitive. Japan and the tigers have, in effect, transferred part of their trade 
surplus with respect to the U.S to China. Quite staggeringly, in 2004 foreign-invested 
enterprises in China accounted for 57 percent of the country’s total exports, up from just 
15 percent in 1990. As a result, it should come as no surprise that China’s rapidly rising 
share of world merchandise exports is matched almost entirely by a decline in the share 
of Japan, and to a lesser extent, the tigers. According to WTO statistics, between 1993 
and 2003 China’s share rose from 2.8 percent to 5.8 percent while Japan’s share and that 
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of the tigers fell from 9.6 percent to 6.3 percent and 10 percent to 9.5 percent 
respectively.   
 
China’s export performance over the past couple of decades is far less dramatic than that 
of Japan’s in the post-WW2 period. Between 1983-2003, China’s share of world exports 
grew by 3.5 percent. Yet between 1953 and 1973, Japan’s share grew by 4.9 percent, in 
spite of having a weaker comparative advantage in labour-intensive manufactured goods 
and foreign investment contributing virtually nothing to its exports. China’s overall trade 
surplus is also not particularly large at around 2 percent of GDP in 2004. This reflects the 
fact that while China may have a large trade surplus vis-à-vis the U.S, it has a deficit with 
respect to other countries. China’s trade surplus is routinely less than that recorded by 
leading OECD trading nations such as Germany and Japan. In 2003, Germany, for 
example, had a trade surplus equal to 6.3 percent of GDP.  Viewed in this broader 
perspective, the view that China is pursuing a merchantilist development strategy (e.g., 
Kelly, 2005) looks decidedly shaky.   
 
Irrespective of the source of the U.S trade deficit with China, it is patently clear that a 
revaluation of the RMB would do little to reduce the U.S trade deficit overall, which in 
2004 was in the order of $US600 billion, or 5.5 percent of GDP. China accounts for only 
around 10 percent of U.S total trade (and only 3 percent of E.U total trade). As a result, a 
revaluation of more drastic proportions than even the most ardent China critics are calling 
for - say to the tune of 50 percent - would only reduce the dollar’s effective (i.e., trade 
weighted) value by 5 percent. Yet between March 2002 and March 2005, the dollar’s real 
effective value fell by 27.6 percent, a time period during which the U.S trade deficit only 
widened.  The answer to the problem of the trade deficit lies elsewhere, notably in raising 
private and public savings rates in the U.S. McKinnon (2004, p.330) makes the self-
evident but important point that as long as the U.S household savings rate remains 
unusually low and the U.S government runs a large budget deficit (3.5 percent of GDP in 
2004), “...the relatively high-savings East Asian countries are virtually forced to run 
export surpluses in order to lend their "surplus" savings to the United States - whatever 
the exchange rate regime”. 
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It is sometimes said that China adopting a more flexible exchange rate would have a 
broader impact because it would solve a coordination problem faced by other East Asian 
countries. This line of thinking argues that other East Asian countries are resistant to 
allowing their currencies to become more flexible (and presumably appreciate) without 
China doing likewise for fear that their exporters would be undercut.  There are numerous 
problems with this argument however. For one, the numbers remain small. World Trade 
Organization (WTO) statistics show that trade with China plus the six East Asian Traders 
(Hong Kong, Korea, Malaysia, Singapore, Taiwan and Thailand) still only amounts to a 
little over 20 percent of U.S total trade. Thus, a general appreciation of these country’s 
currencies to the tune of 25 percent would only reduce the dollar’s effective value by 
around 5 percent.  Secondly, China’s export structure means that it does not heavily 
compete in third-country markets with many of the East Asian countries that more or less 
fix their currencies to the dollar anyway. Thirdly, this logic assumes that a coordination 
failure has been behind the reluctance of East Asian countries to adopt more flexible 
exchange rate regimes in the past. But the penchant of East Asian countries for 
maintaining stable exchange rates is more readily explained by the fact that their mutual 
development has been well-served by them. Since the 1980s Japan has been the exception 
in East Asia in terms of having a genuinely flexible exchange rate and the performance of 
its economy since this time has hardly been confidence inspiring for its neighbors.   
 
Another relevant issue here is that the dollar value of overall trade flows is a poor guide 
to the size and distribution of benefits. U.S consumers clearly benefit from cheap Chinese 
imports and Andy Xie from Morgan Stanley has also estimated that for each dollar of 
China trade the U.S value-added is six to eight times China’s. Thus, while in 2004 the 
dollar value of U.S exports to China may only have been 17.7 percent the dollar value of 
imports from China, the profits accruing to U.S firms are likely to have been in excess of 
those accruing to their Chinese counterparts. It should also not be forgotten that more 
than half of China’s exports originate from foreign-invested companies, including those 
established with U.S capital. It is for these reasons that industry bodies in the U.S have 
not been particularly vocal in supporting the government’s call for an RMB appreciation 
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and they have certainly been much quieter than in the Japan-bashing episodes of the early 
1980s.  
 
Finally, it is worthwhile elaborating upon the unusual way in which the statistics collated 
by the U.S Department of Commerce deal with Hong Kong’s entrepôt trade. The U.S-
China Business Council notes that these statistics count the full value of Chinese re-
exports from Hong Kong as being Chinese exports, despite the fact that services (simple 
processing, packaging, marketing, etc) provided in Hong Kong add roughly 25 percent to 
the value of the goods originally exported from China. Meanwhile, all U.S goods 
exported to Hong Kong are counted as exports to Hong Kong, even those that are re-
exported to China. According to Nicholas Lardy from the Institute of International 
Economics, after accounting for Hong Kong’s entrepôt trade, the actual U.S trade deficit 
with China in 2003 was 11.5 percent less than that recorded by the Department of 
Commerce.  
 
2. The decline in China’s real effective exchange rate since late 2001 means the RMB 
must now be undervalued.  
 
China’s real effective exchange rate fell by 14 percent between July 2001 and January 
2005. A longer-term perspective however shows that this alone does not necessarily 
imply the RMB is undervalued. The value of the RMB in January 2005 was the same as 
in early 1996. Moreover, this level was only about 8 percent less than at the height of the 
Asian financial crisis in the second half of 1997. At this time speculators were betting on 
an RMB devaluation as the prevailing wisdom was that the Chinese currency had been 
rendered decidedly overvalued. Debates over China’s equilibrium exchange rate over the 
past decade have amply illustrated the limitations of estimates provided by economists. 
Estimates of undervaluation currently range between 0-50 percent. Estimates of 
overvaluation during the Asian financial crisis were similarly vague.   
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3. Productivity improvements associated with China’s economic transformation mean 
that the RMB must now be undervalued.  
 
Ceteris paribus, if over the past decade productivity had grown more rapidly in China 
than in the U.S, then there would be a case for RMB appreciation. The problem though is 
that it is not at all clear that this is what has happened.  It is true that in the late 1970s and 
1980s China was able to elicit rapid improvements in total factor productivity by 
liberalizing its agricultural and non-state sectors. A study by IMF economists (Hu and 
Khan, 1998) estimated that the average annual rate of productivity growth in China over 
the period 1979-1994 was 3.9 percent. This compared with around 2 percent in other 
Asian tigers (during 1966-1991) and 0.4 percent in the U.S (during 1960-1989). 
However, Sachs and Woo (1997) warned some time ago that such simple sources of 
productivity growth associated with China’s transitional economy were likely to soon be 
exhausted and continued gains would be dependent upon reforming the more challenging 
state-owned sector. Reforming the state sector has been the policy focus since the mid-
1990s and while progress has been made, the pace has been more gradual. Anecdotally, 
the fact that higher economic growth rates over the past decade have required ever-larger 
shares of GDP be devoted to investment is hardly evocative of an economy experiencing 
rapid improvements in total factor productivity. Table 1 shows that the incremental 
capital-output ratio in China has remained roughly constant since 1996. U.S productivity 
meanwhile picked up during the 1990s. China’s experience during the 1980s also shows 
how the impact of relative productivity movements on the exchange rate can easily be 
swamped by other factors. By the time a unified exchange rate was adopted in 1994 and 
the official rate was allowed to converge to the rate in currency swap markets at the time 
(i.e., the market rate), the RMB had depreciated from RMB1.5:$US1 at the start of the 
reform period to RMB8.28:$US1, in spite of any relative productivity improvements.  
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Table 1. Selected economic data 
 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
1. Real GDP growth (%) 9.6 8.8 7.8 7.1 8.0 7.5 8.3 9.3 9.5
Gross capital formation 
2. (% GDP) 
39.3 38.0 37.4 37.1 36.4 38.0 39.2 42.3 
3. Incremental capital-
output ratio (ie. 1 / 2) 
0.24 0.23 0.21 0.19 0.22 0.20 0.21 0.22 
4. Money supply growth 
(%) 
25.3 20.7 14.9 14.7 12.3 15.0 19.4 19.7 14.8
5. Domestic credit 
growth (%) 
24.6 19.8 20.0 12.1 11.0 13.6 29.3 19.6 9.2
6. Fixed investment 
growth (%) 
14.8 8.8 13.9 5.1 10.3 13.0 16.9 27.7 25.8
Source – National Bureau of Statistics and the People’s Bank of China.  
 
4. The surge in China’s foreign exchange reserves proves the RMB is being held at below 
equilibrium levels to boost exports.  
 
This argument fails to distinguish between the contribution of the trade surplus to foreign 
exchange accumulation and the contribution of speculative capital inflows betting on an 
RMB revaluation. Over the period 2001-2004, the current account surplus accounted for 
just 34 percent of total reserve accumulation while the dominant source was capital 
inflows other than FDI (Table 2). A study published by economists from the IMF (Prasad 
and Wei, 2005) reported that nearly 75 percent of the change in capital flows has come 
from categories of flows sensitive to market expectations on the future trend of the 
RMB/$US exchange rate, rather than the underlying fundamentals. Needless to say, 
speculative sentiments can quickly change.  
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Table 2. China’s foreign exchange reserves - sources of accumulation 
 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
Total reserves, inc. 
gold ($US billion) 
108 143 150 158 169 219 295 457 1 619
Total reserve 
accumulation, inc. 
gold (RES AC) ($US 
billion) 
32 36 6 9 11 50 77 162  207
Current account 
balance (CAS) ($US 
billion) 
7 37 31 21 21 17 35 46 70
Net FDI ($US billion) 38 42 41 37 37 37 47 47 61 2 
Net non-FDI 3 ($US 
billion) 
-13 -43 -66 -49 -47 -4 -5 69 77
GDP ($US billion) 821 903 954 999 1079 1176 1271 1412 1593
CAS (% GDP) 0.8 4.1 3.2 2.1 1.9 1.4 2.8 3.2 3.0
RES AC (% GDP) 3.9 4.0 0.6 0.9 1.0 4.3 6.1 11.5 3.9
Source – International Monetary Fund 
Notes – 
1. In 2003 the Chinese government used $US45 billion from its foreign reserves to recapitalize two state 
banks. As a result, the 2003 figure for total reserves is the official value plus $US 45 billion. The 2004 
figure is simply the official estimate. This has been done in keeping with Roubini and Setser (2005).  
2. The FDI figure for 2004 it is not a net figure. It is simply inward FDI. The source is the National Bureau 
of Statistics. In previous years, outward FDI recorded in the national accounts has been very small. 
3. Net non-FDI is calculated as the residual of the change in total reserve accumulation minus net FDI 
minus the current account balance.  
 
3. THE FLEXIBILITY DEBATE 
A consensus position has emerged which argues that China would benefit from greater 
exchange rate flexibility because the increase in monetary independence it entails would 
be more conducive to maintaining macroeconomic stability. Macroeconomic stability 
does need to be accorded the utmost importance given that it has underpinned all of 
China’s other successes during the reform period. However, the first point to note in 
response is simply that international data do not suggest that flexible exchange rate 
regimes outperform fixed regimes in terms of macroeconomic stability. In fact, the data 
speak convincingly to the opposite effect. In a study of this issue, IMF economists, 
Ghosh, et al. (1996, p.12), concluded -   
 
“Does the exchange rate regime matter for macroeconomic performance? 
The experience of IMF member countries since the 1960s suggests that it 
does. The strongest results concern inflation. Pegged exchange rates are 
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associated with significantly better inflation performance (lower inflation 
and less variability), and there is at least some evidence of a causal 
relationship. There is, however, an important caveat. Countries that have 
frequent parity changes – while notionally maintaining a peg – are unlikely 
to reap the full anti-inflationary benefits of a fixed exchange rate regime”  
 
Thus, not only does the data point to a better inflationary outcome under a fixed regime it 
also appears to lend support to China’s reluctance to undertake frequent adjustments at 
the behest of fluctuations in sentiment regarding the equilibrium value of the RMB.  
 
Much of the recent shift in orthodoxy towards flexible exchange rate regimes appears to 
have been motivated by the events of the Asian financial crisis. Yet this misses the bigger 
picture. The same economies that experienced a relatively short period of crisis had 
earlier experienced long periods of macroeconomic stability and rapid economic growth 
under a fixed exchange rate regime and returned to a stable exchange rate and strong 
growth once the crisis had passed (McKinnon and Schnabl, 2004). If China was looking 
for policy inspiration from its neighbors, the Japanese experience would be the one that 
stands out. A more flexible yen brought on largely by pressure from the U.S in the early 
1980s did nothing to promote macroeconomic stability or steel the Japanese economy 
against speculative activities and it continues to languish from the bursting of the bubble 
economy more than a decade ago.  It would be a serious misreading of the evidence to 
claim that the experience of East Asia shows that economic development is best served 
by flexible exchange rate regimes.   
 
The case for a flexible regime also appears to have been given a popularity boost by 
increasingly mobile international capital flows. It is often said that given the sheer 
volume of international capital flows these days if speculators feel a currency is 
incorrectly valued it would be futile for a central bank to try and defend it. For Mundell 
(2003), this misses the point. Credibility is the key issue. Mundell points out that we do 
not see any speculative capital movements within countries as the exchange rate 
domestically is entirely credible. If a peg is credible, speculation will in fact be 
discouraged. Juxtaposed against countries such as Thailand during the Asian financial 
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crisis, China’s has a healthy stockpile of foreign exchange reserves and is running current 
account surpluses. In the current environment, China’s credibility will only be lost if it 
becomes clear that exchange rate stability is costing the economy excessively in terms of 
macroeconomic stability.  
 
This leads to our second objection to the consensus position. Despite suggestions to the 
contrary, it is not at all clear that exchange rate stability has contributed to 
macroeconomic instability in China in a significant way. According to the consensus 
view, as hot money has flowed into China the People’s Bank of China (PBC) has been 
forced to buy dollar assets to maintain the exchange rate stability and this has resulted in 
a rapidly expanding domestic money supply, excessive fixed asset investment and 
increases in inflationary pressure, particularly with respect to asset prices. But as HSBC 
(2005) has pointed out, total foreign capital inflows in 2004 were only equal to around 20 
percent of the total value of fixed asset investment. If dampening inflationary pressure 
and slowing the rate of fixed asset investment is the goal, domestic credit is the most 
obvious place to start. This was precisely the approach taken by the Chinese authorities in 
2004 with the growth rate in domestic credit falling from 19.6 percent in 2003 to 9.2 
percent in 2004 (Table 1). Inflation which began rising in 2003 and 2004 began to fall in 
2005. World Bank (2005) observes that at the end of the first quarter of 2005, the growth 
rate in the domestic money supply had slowed to within the target range set by the 
monetary authorities. Also acting to limit the inflationary pressures wrought by foreign 
capital inflows has been sterilization activities undertaken by the central bank. Stephen 
Green from Standard Chartered Bank has estimated that the PBC sterilized 47.5 percent 
of foreign exchange inflows during 2004 and around 70 percent in the first half of 2005. 
The costs of this sterilization have also been extremely low (see Green, 2005).  
 
The fact that exchange rate stability can help to anchor the domestic price level appears 
to have been forgotten. Xu (2000) showed that a striking long run correlation exists 
between movements in the domestic price level and the real exchange rate dating back to 
the start of the reform period. Xu interprets this relationship to be a bi-causal one. Before 
the adoption of a unified exchange rate in 1994, changes in the official exchange rate 
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followed domestic price level fluctuations (i.e., inflationary episodes forced 
devaluations). Since 1994 when the official rate was allowed to depreciate to the 
prevailing market rate and by which time China’s global trade linkages had strengthened, 
stability in the exchange rate has helped to secure the domestic price level. Indeed, for all 
the talk of inflationary pressure in the consensus literature, it is odd that few have sought 
to explain why actual inflation remains low. For Mundell and McKinnon, the answer is 
plain enough – the stable exchange rate is doing its job in serving as a price anchor and is 
doing it very well. The price anchor role of the exchange rate is sometimes dismissed on 
the basis that bilateral trade with the U.S represents only a fraction of China’s total trade. 
But this misses the point made repeatedly by McKinnon that the overwhelming majority 
of trade within East Asia is invoiced in $US and that other countries in the region (with 
the notable exception of Japan) also more or less peg to the dollar.  
 
Our third criticism of the consensus view is that it understates the importance of 
institutions in managing a flexible exchange rate regime. On the one hand, in highlighting 
the dangers posed by hot money inflows, the consensus literature frequently refers to the 
difficulties faced by the PBC in undertaking effective sterilization when domestic 
financial markets are underdeveloped.  Yet at the same time it calls upon the PBC to use 
these financial markets to target inflation through open market operations as is done in 
most OECD economies. Central banks in OECD economies have at their disposal a 
powerful monetary transmission channel that results from having a complete set of 
financial markets where interest rates are market determined and where borrowers are 
sensitive to changes in the cost of borrowing.  In contrast, China’s financial markets are 
shallow, incomplete, highly regulated (see Bottlier, 2003) and the major borrowers, the 
state-owned enterprises, in many cases still do not face a hard budget constraint. Thus, 
the success of inflation targeting in OECD economies over the past couple of decades is 
of limited relevance to China today. To be sure, as Green (2005) has pointed out, 
progress in China’s domestic financial markets is being made, but for good reason 
monetary policy in China continues to rely heavily on direct administrative controls such 
as formal (and informal) limits to credit growth rather than indirect measures such as 
interest rate adjustments.   
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In China there is also a distinct absence of financial markets that perform risk 
management roles such as hedging against exchange rate fluctuations. While bankers and 
traders in OECD economies have ready access to instruments such as exchange rate 
futures contracts that can protect them against undesirable exchange rate fluctuations, in 
developing countries such as China these agents rely on the de-facto hedge of a stable 
exchange rate. In the aftermath of the Asian financial crisis, using a stable exchange rate 
to provide a hedge was criticised on the basis that it might worsen the moral hazard in 
domestic banks and encourage them to over-borrow in foreign currency. McKinnon and 
Schnabl (2004) have pointed out however that the risk premium in domestic interest rates 
is dependent upon how stable the domestic currency is relative to the currency of 
borrowing, i.e., the $US. As a result, if the cross rate varies erratically, domestic interest 
rates will be higher and so to will the margin of temptation to over-borrow in foreign 
exchange.  For this reason they conclude it is not possible to say a priori whether a stable 
exchange rate worsens the moral hazard in poorly regulated banks to over-borrow. In any 
case, the key issue is the effectiveness of banking sector prudential regulation not the 
exchange rate regime.     
 
A final concern we have with a flexible exchange rate has to do with the implications 
increased volatility would have on Hong Kong - the showcase of the one country, two 
systems approach and an autonomous region that operates a hard peg to the dollar. Hong 
Kong is the classic textbook example of a small, open country that benefits from a stable 
exchange rate vis-à-vis its trading partners Hong Kong’s trade is more than two and a 
half times the size of its GDP. According to Hong Kong trade statistics, in 2004 total 
trade (direct and entrepôt) with the mainland accounted for 43.7 percent of its total, 
followed by trade with the U.S at 11 percent. It is often asserted that because China’s 
exports have a high imported component, an RMB appreciation would only marginally 
impact on export growth. Yet given the dependence of Hong Kong on trade with the 
mainland even a modest appreciation would be of concern for the much smaller, more 
trade dependent economy. Hong Kong has also been by far the largest "foreign" investor 
in the mainland with the Hong Kong Trade Development Council claiming that at the end 
 14
of 2004, 47 percent of overseas registered projects on the mainland had Hong Kong 
connections. While the consensus literature tends to cite econometric studies which 
suggest that on average FDI and exchange rate fluctuations are only weakly related, 
authors such as Mundell (2003) and McKinnon and Schnabl (2003) prefer to point out 
case studies closer to home that may well be considered more pertinent by China’s policy 
makers. Japanese FDI into many other East Asian countries, for example, has tended to 
closely follow trend movements in the ¥ /US$ exchange rate.  
 
4. CONCLUSION 
The exchange rate debate in China has emerged as one of the most talked about topics in 
international economics. In our reading of the existing literature, there are numerous 
myths purporting to be facts and the debate regarding the appropriate degree of exchange 
rate flexibility is more one-sided than is desirable. There is little solid evidence that 
China’s currency is undervalued and even if it were, given the variation in equilibrium 
exchange rate estimates offered by economists, reluctance on the part of China’s policy-
makers to significantly revalue the RMB is unsurprising. Many of the benefits currently 
accruing to China as a result of a stable exchange rate also appear insufficiently 
recognized (e.g., an anchor for the domestic price level) and similarly many of the costs 
involved in moving to a flexible regime (e.g., institutional constraints). Perhaps the most 
prominent shortcoming of the consensus position is that it fails to convincingly 
demonstrate how exchange rate stability is at the root of problems in China’s economy 
today (e.g., inflationary pressure).  China’s economic performance over the past decade 
suggests that it has not been hopelessly trying to reconcile the "irreconcilable trilemma" 
from macroeconomic theory, which states that a country cannot simultaneously pursue 
free capital mobility, a fixed exchange rate and an independent monetary policy. While 
its capital controls are certainly porous to a degree, when combined with partial 
sterilization and monetary policy in which administrative tools remain effective, China 
has been able to maintain both maintain both macroeconomic stability and a stable 
exchange rate.  
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China is also fortunate in the sense that its high savings rate, cheap labor force and 
attractive domestic market means that it does not face the same opportunity cost other 
developing countries might when retaining capital controls (Laurenceson, 2005). The 
usual argument underlying the position that even developing countries are best served by 
flexible exchange rates is that it will allow them to use an independent monetary policy to 
maintain macroeconomic stability while removing capital controls, with the assumption 
being that the benefits of integrating into global financial markets (e.g., investment 
funding, consumption smoothing, etc.) more than outweigh the costs of abandoning a 
stable exchange rate. But with a savings to GDP ratio consistently around 40 percent, 
China already has ample savings to fund investment. The problem for the domestic 
financial sector has always been one of using existing savings more efficiently rather than 
the need to mobilize more. Also, it is incorrect to say that China has not liberalized 
capital controls. Restrictions over FDI have been gradually liberalized to the extent that 
in 2002 China received more FDI than any other country in the world. Consequently, the 
opportunity cost to China of maintaining the capital controls that support exchange rate 
stability is foregoing access to more non-FDI capital (that in aggregate it does not really 
need anyway) and the chance for domestic savers to earn higher returns abroad. Given 
that macroeconomic stability, foreign trade and FDI have underpinned the rapid growth 
in living standards during the reform period, forgoing the opportunities of higher returns 
abroad is likely to be considered an acceptable sacrifice by the average Chinese saver.  
 
In the longer term, moving to a flexible exchange rate regime may pass the cost-benefit 
test. Once China’s institutional environment has been bolstered, for example, a managed 
float will become more appealing. Yet based on what we know about the economy at this 
point in time and the lessons learned from other countries, the area most urgently in need 
of policy attention is domestic financial reform - strengthening prudential regulation, 
shoring up the capital base of the banks, resolving ownership ambiguities, instituting 
effective corporate governance structures and building more complete, unfettered, liquid 
and transparent direct financial markets.  
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